Russia is Pretending That the Incursion Isn't Happening
Russia is Pretending That the Incursion Isn't Happening
Russia's red lines have become blurred lines
On June 5, Russian leader Vladimir Putin once again warned that Russia could use nuclear weapons if its territory was threatened. "We have a nuclear doctrine, look what it says. If someone's actions threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we consider it possible for us to use all means at our disposal," he said, speaking to international journalists in St. Petersburg, Russia.
On August 22, Ukraine said it controls over 1,250 square kilometers of Russian territory in the Kursk region. Kyiv continues to make marginal advances inside Russia, according to the Institute for the Study of War. There are no signs that Russia is redeploying nuclear weapons to try to regain its territory. There are few signs that Russia wants to redeploy the troops -- currently focused on making gains in eastern Ukraine -- to retake its own sovereign territory. (Earlier this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia's muted reaction to the incursion was proof that U.S. and European fears about Russia using nuclear weapons in response to Western weapons deliveries were "naive.")
Instead of nuclear saber-rattling, the Kremlin has deployed a propaganda strategy of downplaying the incursion of the first foreign troops on Russian soil since Hitler's 1941 invasion. Speaking to the Latvia-based Russian news outlet Meduza, Kremlin sources said this strategy is an attempt to convince Russians that the incursion is part of a "new normal," a phrase which the Kremlin deployed during the pandemic and at the outset of the full-scale invasion.
This strategy was on full view as Putin held a nationally-televised meeting with local officials on August 12. The acting Kursk governor, Alexei Smirnov, began reporting on the Ukrainian gains. Putin cut him off using a formal form of address: "Listen, Alexei Borisovich, the military department will report to us on the breadth and depth of the situation there. You should focus on the socioeconomic situation and assistance to people.” Several days later, Smirnov did as told: he later announced that reinforced concrete shelters would be built in Kursk.
In keeping with the business-as-usual approach, Smirnov, the governor from Putin's party, and other local officials are facing elections as scheduled on September 8. (Like most races in Russia, Smirnov's election isn't expected to be competitive.) While local officials canceled voting in a few districts directly under Ukrainian control, the Kremlin decided to go ahead with elections in the Kursk region as a whole, as well as other bordering regions (and Crimea) that regularly face attacks from Ukrainian drones and missiles. Local election officials will reportedly get bulletproof vests and helmets.
The "new normal" strategy can also be seen on Russian news shows. On his August 19 show, propagandist Vladimir Solovyov urged Russians to keep quiet about the Kursk incursion. "First of all, everyone should calm down a bit," he said in his opening monologue, adding that the West had seen Russian military bloggers having "apoplectic stroke[s]" in an "information panic." He reminded his audience that Russians "don't get hysterical."
The keep-calm strategy may be a tactic to allay anxieties: according to two recent sociological surveys of Russians, fears are mounting. (All polling on Russia should be taken with a grain of salt.) A telephone survey of approximately 1,200 Russians overseen by Ukrainian political scientist Vadym Denysenko showed that from May to August, the number of Russians dissatisfied with the results of the "special military operation" jumped 12 points. In addition, a Russian weekly sociological survey about war attitudes found that feelings of fear jumped six points after the incursion, while approval ratings of government figures remained relatively unchanged. This finding seems to indicate that the business-as-usual strategy has insulated national political leaders.
The muted reaction indicates how loathe the Kremlin is to mobilize a rattled populace over its war. On his show, the propagandist Solovyov urged men to get off the sidelines and enlist. Another news segment implausibly claimed that men were mostly motivated by patriotism -- and not large signing bonuses -- to defend the homeland. However, at this point, these calls aren't backed by a real declaration of emergency that would involve acknowledging the humiliating failure of the Russian state to defend its own territory.