Q&A: Lithuania's Former Top Diplomat Says the U.S.-Russia Talks Feel a Bit Like the Hitler-Stalin Pact
A conversation with Gabrielius Landsbergis about the Munich Security Conference, the U.S.-Russia talks without Ukraine, and the future of Europe
This past week has seen a sea change in European security. On February 12, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he had spoken with Russian leader Vladimir Putin and that the two countries would begin talks on ending the Ukraine war. Subsequently, Trump Administration officials traveled to Europe and said that it wasn't realistic for Ukraine to join NATO or get back all of the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that U.S. troops, which have been in Europe since 1945 to prevent a war with Russia, would not defend the continent "forever." On February 18, U.S. and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia to begin talks on Ukraine and European security with no representatives from Ukraine or European countries.
To help make sense of these developments, I spoke to former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis. He served as the country's top diplomat from 2020 until 2024, leaving his post at the end of last year. On February 17, he joined the Advisory Board of the Munich Security Conference, where he was last weekend. We spoke on February 18 over Zoom. Our conversation follows, slightly edited for clarity.
Luke Johnson: The U.S. and Russia are meeting today in Saudi Arabia for talks on Ukraine, and neither Ukrainian nor European officials are invited. What do you expect out of this meeting?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: This has an eerie resemblance to the pact that was signed by [Soviet and German foreign ministers] Molotov and Ribbentrop in 1939. The countries of Europe were divided not only into spheres of one country or another, but left open for attack and occupation by Germany and the Soviet Union. Here, two countries are talking about the minerals of Ukraine and the sovereignty of Ukraine, and Ukraine is nowhere near the table. It's a very horrifying precedent that we are seeing in the 21st century. We thought that this was something that belonged in the history that we teach our kids and it will never be repeated. But unfortunately, here we are.
LJ: You are from Lithuania, one of the Baltic states. How important are U.S. troops there? And what would happen if Trump agreed to Russian demands to remove them, as some European officials expect?
GL: We have about 1,000 American troops in Lithuania, and we think that they are a major deterrent for any Russian activity within our country. If Russia were to attack Lithuania, Russia would be fighting Americans here. Russia doesn't want to do that. Having Americans out would change dynamics dramatically. It would be a clear sign of the U.S. retreating and leaving open a part of Europe for Russian influence. At the very least, we would see Russians getting way more active in the region. Would that lead to escalation against NATO? I wouldn't discount that.
LJ: Do you think that Europe should view the U.S. as an adversary?
GL: No, I don't think so. Not yet. We have to maintain cooperation as long as it's possible. When it comes to the defense of Europe, unfortunately, it's impossible to do it without the U.S. Europe needs to stand up and match the threats with our defense spending. But we cannot alienate Americans. I've always advocated: look beyond insults. We're not in school anymore. There are things that we need to do, and let's focus on those.
The mood is rather dark. It's not good. It felt as if Americans were stepping down. Europe is trying to figure out whether it can step up. Everywhere you look, the Chinese delegation clearly intends to take what's left.
LJ: At the Munich Security Conference, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said, "Does America need Europe? As a market, yes. But as an ally? For the answer to be 'yes,' Europe needs a single voice — not a dozen different ones." Is Europe capable of acting with one voice, and if so, what should it do?
GL: Europe was structured in a way so that it would not be able to move fast. When Europe moved fast in the past, it brought us two world wars. Therefore, the EU was full of obstacles, regulation, and consensus-building, so that, even if we wanted to move fast, we were unable to.
Now we have to change that, because we're just not fit for the task. We don't want to wage war. We want to defend ourselves, and we want to be able to defend our allies. The intention is clearly there. So in theory, yes, Europe is clearly capable. We have the money, we have the resources, we have the knowledge and industry. My main question is whether we have enough time now to rewrite the rules so that we would be ready for the test again.
LJ: Should Europe create its own army?
GL: Well, not this Europe. We were unable to make a decision on whether to recognize the [disputed] Georgian elections. So, imagine this Europe having an army, and then a general calling headquarters in Brussels asking whether he can cross a bridge and then the Hungarians vetoing it. For an army, you have to have structures that would be politically ready to react. If Europe is able to reform itself into something that is able to function in this new geopolitical environment, then, yes, it can strengthen its military muscle, but it has to go in parallel with how Europe functions.
LJ: Absent that, what are some steps that Europe could take to defend itself that would be more immediate?
GL: Europe can strengthen its industry. Europe can produce equipment. Europe can arm its member states. Europe can offer logistics. Europe can strengthen railroads.
There's a lot within Europe that can be done that would strengthen us militarily, not just having an army of a million people. When it comes to Ukraine, Europe can integrate Ukraine into the EU. That works as a deterrent. For Russians to attack Ukraine when it's a member of the EU, it's a different story than when it's out there in the gray zone. Within NATO, we can combine our armies, we can do training. We can prepare for Russian escalation. There is a lot that the EU and NATO can and should complement each other.
LJ: You were at the Munich Security Conference. How did you feel coming away from it?
GL: Well, the mood is rather dark, I can tell you. It's not good. It felt as if Americans were stepping down. Europe is trying to figure out whether it can step up. Everywhere you look, the Chinese delegation clearly intends to take what's left.
LJ: What do you mean by that?
GL: There are countries that have been waiting for meetings with Chinese officials for years. They've been held in the diplomatic freezer, so to speak. Suddenly, the doors open, and China is all over the place. It's interested in meeting European leaders, talking about how much it's interested in stability in Europe, and how it understands the principle of territorial integrity in Ukraine--China is saying all the right words. What's the reason behind it? Clearly, this is a campaign built to drive a wedge deeper between the EU and U.S.
LJ: And presumably make a lot of money in the process.
GL: Presumably, yeah. China can be involved in rebuilding Ukraine. It can offer to establish itself in the port of Odesa, for example. Ukraine is a very lucrative partner to have. There are so many things that Ukraine can offer to those who partner with it. The Chinese can think: the U.S. botched it. The EU is not up to the task. We can take it.
China does not want to see the West united, especially if it starts being really aggressive in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. It would like us to be separate: Europe, silent and unable to move because of economic--and now even possibly geopolitical--dependencies.
LJ: It seems like the transatlantic alliance is at its lowest point, maybe ever, and this is something that would make it fall even lower.
GL: Yeah. It is possible that officials in the current U.S. administration thought that maybe they could play a Kissinger move in dividing China and Russia--getting closer to Russia and splitting it away from China. Actually what they might get is that China might split the EU and U.S. The Kissinger move would be played against us.
LJ: And the EU would look to China as a protector.
GL: There are three options. The best option is for the EU to continue as is, to have the U.S. as a protector, ramp up our industry and pay more [on defense]. Second is, okay, the U.S. is gone, but we do our part. We invest trillions. We build fortress Europe, we have our own battle tanks, European planes, whatever. Well, there is not a lot of chance that this is happening. And the third--if those two are not an option--is to go to China. China's cheap. It will offer something that is available. China will say, sure, we can defend you. We'll talk to the Russians. The Russians won't attack Ukraine anymore; they won't attack the Eastern flank. It will be fine. Just, please, no more tariffs on electrical vehicles, solar panels, forget it.
LJ: When you were the foreign minister for Lithuania -- that's now vowing to spend 5% of its GDP on defense -- what was the biggest hurdle in trying to get larger countries to spend more and send more to Ukraine?
GL: Well, our commitment is still just on paper. There are still people, even in my country, who believe that defense comes easy and cheap. When I was speaking either in my own country or in countries I would visit, I would say, it's impossible to expect that if you want to defend your country that it somehow will be easy. Look at Finland. A quarter of the country is trained to defend it. In our case, it’s a couple of percent. We're still talking about it not in the way that we should. When I suggested that we will need to raise taxes, people thought that it's not nice to raise taxes. But I said, before World War II, the U.K. spent 4-5% of GDP on defense. During the war, it was 50 percent. It is always way more expensive during the war to build and produce than before.
LJ: Do you think the U.S. is serious in trying to take over Greenland?
GL: Yeah, I think so. I think that they're quite serious. I think that President Trump feels now that his mandate allows him to go through with everything that he says, and we have to be prepared for that. About Ukraine, some said that it might be better when he sits at the table with Putin. But, why should it be better? I don't see any reason. It might, but I would rather prepare for something that's way worse. Same goes for Greenland. I mean, why shouldn't he?
We cannot let Denmark deal with this alone. It has to be Europe. Europe can cover for Denmark. We can bargain and we can offer a deal to Trump.
LJ: What's the deal you proposed?
GL: We are able to offer really good contracts when it comes to LNG and purchasing weapons; we will need a lot to defend ourselves if the U.S. is leaving Europe. For Ukraine, most weapons and ammunition would have to come from the U.S. I think that we can offer something that will bring contracts for American companies; many jobs will be created. It's a good deal. When it comes to Greenland, Europe can offer a treaty that would expand how the U.S. can operate in Greenland.
LJ: This past week has seen a lot of change in European security. What are you looking ahead to?
GL: When I'm able to offer advice, I suggest to officials that we have to prepare for a bad scenario. We have to prepare for a very fast deal between the U.S. and Russia. Ukraine and Europe will not be invited, so we'll have to either take it or leave it. Most likely, we won't be able to take it, because it will be a very poor deal for Ukraine and Europe. We have to figure out how to support Ukraine without U.S. assistance.
LJ: If Europe says no to the deal, what should it do?
GL: Be prepared to support Ukraine in ways that we didn't do in those three years, really carry the burden. Imagine that our own lives depend on the way that war in Ukraine ends.
LJ: What would that mean concretely?
GL: Supporting Ukraine with equipment, ammunition, air defense, taking over all the things that the U.S. would send to Ukraine, and figuring out how we are going to do that.
LJ: Like the Taurus [long-range] missiles in Germany, for example?
GL: Yeah, that could be one example, but Ukraine needs air defense missiles. It needs 155-millimeter ammunition. There's just so much that Ukraine needs.
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