A Tired Western Decision-Making Pattern On Ukraine May Have Run Out of Time

Ask-threat-indecision is not a strategy for success

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Joe Biden in 2020. Photo Credit: (Gage Skidmore/Creative Commons 2.0)

On September 26, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House, likely their last meeting before Biden leaves office in January. The White House announced an $8 billion military aid package for Ukraine, but left one thing out of it: permission to use U.S., British, and French missiles to strike deep into Russia.

For months, the Ukrainians have asked for this permission to defend themselves against Russian bombs and missiles which are targeting civilians and energy infrastructure. For months, the Biden Administration has declined to grant it. In the past two weeks, Biden held two high-profile meetings on Ukraine, but announced no policy change: the first was on September 13 with U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and thirteen days later with Zelensky. Both meetings were immediately preceded by threats of nuclear retaliation by Russian leader Vladimir Putin: first, he said that allowing permission would mean that NATO was "at war" with Russia, and then, he announced a policy shift that Russia could now use its nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state backed by a nuclear-armed one. (This was a thinly-veiled reference to Ukraine.)

This pattern of Ukrainian ask, Russian threat, and American indecision makes it look like the United States is caving to reflexive control, a Russian tactic of influencing an opponent's decision-making through threats. In the past, the U.S. and Western allies like Germany have hesitated on giving Ukraine weapons and limited permission to strike inside Russia before ultimately relenting. However, this latest iteration of this pattern may not end with a reversal because the Biden Administration has little time left.

After Zelensky met with Biden, the New York Times published a U.S. intelligence assessment warning of the risks of granting Ukraine this permission. It warned of "stepped up" and "potentially lethal" attacks on European and U.S. military facilities in Europe. However, the article did not note any new or specific threats. The assessment further warned that granting permission would not change the war in a "fundamental" way and that Russia would likely relocate things like aircraft, ammunition depots, and command posts to outside the 190-mile range of ATACMS, the U.S. long-range missile that Ukraine wants permission to strike with.

However, using open-source intelligence, the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War has published a list of 245 known military objects within range of ATACMS. The institute noted that while Russia has relocated some aircraft away from the Ukrainian border, "the mass redeployment of assets away from such facilities would present significant challenges to Russian logistics." Nevertheless, the delays in U.S. permissions have the makings of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more time the Biden Administration delays on this decision, the more time Russia has to move its weapons farther away.

It is simplistic to suggest that a single weapon can change the war in a "fundamental" way. However, it would be equally foolish to suggest that allowing expanded use of long-range missiles would have no change on the war's trajectory. Long-range Western missiles have facilitated Ukrainian successes: Ukraine has used them to strike Russia's military stronghold in Crimea and to inflict defeats on the Russian Navy. (Ukraine has no navy itself.) And long-range strikes have destroyed weapons that have been used to hit Ukrainian cities: just this week, Ukraine launched a drone attack deep in Russia's Tver region, blowing up some $39 million worth of missiles, artillery, and explosives.